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Title VII & LGBTQ Employment Discrimination: An 





Kimberly Hively, Matthew Christiansen, and Jameka Evans all had one 
thing in common. They all asserted that they were subjected to adverse 
employment actions for being gay.1 However, their rights to a remedy 
were anything but similar. The differing outcomes did not originate from 
different forms of harassment, instead it was simply a byproduct of where 
they happened to be employed. One of the three was granted the right to 
seek remedy for discrimination based on her sexual orientation, one was 
only granted the right to seek remedy for discrimination because he 
happened to be an effeminate gay man, and the third was simply denied 
the opportunity to seek any remedy.2 
In the past few decades, the LGBTQ3 community has fought for the 
rights and protections already afforded to other minority identities. 
Although the LGBTQ community has seen success in some areas, like 
establishing the right for same-sex couples to marry, there are still areas 
where LGBTQ individuals are left without recourse from discrimination, 
including in employment. As of today, the LGBTQ community sees an 
inconsistent patchwork of employment protections constructed from an 
array of local and state laws, varying court opinions, and non-binding 
 
* J.D. Washington University in St. Louis School of Law (2019).  
1.  See Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F. 3d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 2017); Zarda v. Altitude 
Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 116 (2d Cir. 2018) (describing Kimberly Hively’s case). 
2.  In Kimberly Hively’s case, she was allowed to maintain a cause of action under Title VII for 
discrimination based on her sexual orientation. See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 
339, 352 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). Matthew Christiansen was not allowed to maintain a cause of 
action based on sexual orientation discrimination but was allowed to maintain a cause of action based 
on the theory that he was terminated in violation of Title VII because, as an effeminate man, he failed 
to conform to sex-stereotypes associated with being male. Christiansen, 852 F. 3d at 199. And Jameka 
Evans’ suit was dismissed at pleadings because the court said sexual orientation discrimination could 
not be a cause of action under Title VII.  Zarda, 883 F.3d at 108. 
3.  LGBTQ here means “lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer”, with “queer” used as an 
umbrella term to describe the limitless identities that exist outside of rigid categories of gender and 
sexual orientation.   
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federal agency decisions.4 
This Note will focus on federal based non-discrimination protection for 
LGBT5 employees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title 
VII”).6 Currently, under Title VII an employee is allowed to bring suit if 
they are discriminated against for not conforming to the stereotypes 
associated with their sex.7 While this does offer some protections for queer 
employees that do not conform to gender norms, there is a current circuit 
split on whether an employee is allowed to allege discrimination based on 
their sexual orientation.8  Although a legislative amendment to Title VII 
explicitly designating gender identity and sexual orientation as protected 
classifications would be ideal, this Note will argue that courts are a more 
pragmatic way of realizing employment protections for LGBT people.    
Part II of this Note examines the history of Title VII, the development 
of the “sex” based discrimination jurisprudence, and the evolution of 
LGBT employment protections under Title VII. Part III of this Note 
evaluates legislative efforts to secure LGBT employment protections and 
presents the argument that judicial solutions are better fit to address 
employment discrimination issues for marginalized minorities including 
LGBT individuals. Part IV summarizes the findings of this Note and 
highlights future possible developments. 
 
 
4.  Although this Note is focused on protections provided at the federal level, some states and local 
ordinances provide LGBTQ community members employment protections.  See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 659A.006 (West); Local Non-Discrimination Ordinances, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT 
PROJECT, http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/non_discrimination_ordinances/policies (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2019).  
5.  Although this Note addresses Title VII applications to the wider LGBTQ community, the 
history section of this Note does not include the broader spectrum of queer identities because there is 
not sufficient case law addressing queer identities outside of homosexual orientations and gender 
identity alignments. 
6.  Given the diversity of the LGBTQ+ community, this Note cannot hope to address the 
relationship of all queer identities under Title VII, but attempts to address LGBTQ employment 
discrimination on a broader level. Nevertheless the proposed solution is sufficiently broad that it could 
provide some guidance to a range of LGBTQ+ claims.  
7.  See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 231-32 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
8.  Compare Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F. 3d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 2017), and Zarda v. 
Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 155 (2d Cir. 2018) with Evans v. Ga. Reg'l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248 
(11th Cir. 2017). 
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A. Title VII Enactment & Initial Treatment 
 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made it unlawful for qualifying 
employers to discriminate because of a person’s “race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin.”9 The anti-discrimination provision did not specifically 
address sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender expression. 
However, efforts to amend Title VII to add sexual orientation as a 
protected classification began in 1974.10 While the text of Title VII 
appears to be quite simple, the meaning of the words “because of sex” has 
sparked considerable debate over the years.11 Even the reason why sex was 
included in Title VII has drawn speculation and debate from 
commentators since the term was added to the bill at “the last minute on 
the floor of the House of Representatives.”12 Many scholars believe that 
the amendment was actually a “joke” in a failed attempt to sabotage the 
bill, while others maintain that the amendment was the result of deliberate 
action from feminist movements.13 Regardless of the reason sex was added 
as a protected class to Title VII, the circumstances of its inclusion leaves 
courts “with little legislative history to guide us in interpreting the Act's 
 
9.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).   
10.  Representative Bella Abzug introduced the Equality Act to the House in 1974, which proposed 
to amend Title VII to include sexual orientation and marital status as protected classes. The bill was 
referred to committee but received no further attention. See H.R. 15692, 93d Cong. (1974); William C. 
Sung, Taking the Fight Back to Title VII: A Case for Redefining "Because of Sex" to Include Gender 
Stereotypes, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 487, 496 (2011). 
11,  When Title VII was enacted, popular culture generally considered sex as a concrete identity, the 
separate distinctions between men and women, but over time social science scholars and medical 
experts have come to view sex, gender, and sexuality as different identities resulting in a divide 
between the legal jurisprudence and the modern social understanding of the word sex. See Lisa J. 
Banks & Hannah Alejandro, Changing Definitions of Sex under Title VII, 2016 A.B.A. SEC. LAB. & 
EMP. L.: NAT’L CONF. ON EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY L. 
12.  Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63, (citing 110 CONG. REC. 2577–84 (1964)). 
13.  Compare Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 428 n.36 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (stating 
“[t]his Court-like all Title VII enthusiasts-is well aware that the sex discrimination prohibition was 
added to Title VII as a joke by the notorious civil rights opponent Howard W. Smith”), with Robert C. 
Bird, More Than A Congressional Joke: A Fresh Look at the Legislative History of Sex Discrimination 
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 137, 138 (1997) (arguing that “the sex 
discrimination provision was the result of complex political struggles involving racial issues, 
presidential politics, and competing factions of the women's rights movement”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship










296 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 60:293 
 
 
prohibition against discrimination based on ‘sex.’”14 
The first courts to interpret the “because of sex” provision adopted a 
narrow, conservative, traditional language interpretation of the statute.15 
Under this narrow interpretation, courts maintained that sex discrimination 
was only discrimination based on the biological distinction between males 
and females, and rejected the claims that sex included transsexuals or 
pregnancy.16  Similarly, the initial Title VII claims that asserted allegations 
for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation were rejected.17  
Some initial arguments employees made seeking protection under Title 
VII asserted that sexual preference and sex related stereotypes were 
sufficiently correlated to sex to justify extending the sex classification to 
include sexual orientation.18 The correlation argument asserted that since 
there was an underlying correlation between discrimination based on 
sexual preference and discrimination based on sex that “sexual preference 
[should] be considered a subcategory of the “sex” category of Title VII.”19   
The sex stereotype argument asserted that the employees were 
discriminated against for having an “effeminate” appearance and that type 
of discrimination violated Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination 
because it was based on the stereotypes of accepted roles of men and 
women.20 Courts continued to reject these arguments, relying on 
congressional inaction as proof that Congress intended to restrict the 
meaning of sex to the “traditional” meaning, that men and women were 
treated equally.21 And even though some courts recognized that textually 
 
14.  Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 128 n.31 (2d Cir. 2018). 
15.  See, e.g., Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977) (using the 
plain meaning of the statute and subsequent Title VII legislative activity to determine that Congress 
intended the word “sex” to be understood “traditionally” for the limited purpose of “plac[ing] women 
on an equal footing with men,” and holding that “transsexual” discrimination claims were not 
actionable under Title VII).  
16.  See, e.g., id.; see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 128 (1976) (holding that an 
employer’s disability benefits plan does not violate Title VII just because it fails to cover pregnancy-
related disabilities). 
17.  DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding the plaintiffs’ 
arguments that they were unlawfully discriminated against under Title VII for being homosexual as an 
invalid basis for recovery). 
18.  Id. 
19.  Id. at 329. 
20.  Id. at 331. 
21.  Id. at 329. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol60/iss1/17
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the word sex could be read much broader, they similarly adhered to the 
idea that since Congress had not acted to expand the definition, Title VII’s 
sex discrimination prohibition narrowly applied to biological 
distinctions.22 
 
B. The Supreme Court Explains the Meaning of Sex 
 
Despite opportunities to do so, the Supreme Court has not yet drawn 
explicit boundaries on the meaning of Title VII’s sex discrimination, and 
they have not directly addressed whether sexual orientation discrimination 
is actionable under Title VII.23 However, in two separate rulings, the Court 
held that the meaning of sex in Title VII went beyond the mere biological 
distinctions of the male and female body.24   
The first time the Supreme Court specifically addressed the meaning of 
the word “sex” in Title VII was in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.25 The 
Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, held that Title VII’s sex 
discrimination was not merely targeted at the biological designations 
between men and women, but instead aimed to “strike at the entire 
spectrum” of discrimination on the basis of sex, including discrimination 
on the basis of gender stereotypes.26  The Court found that the plaintiff’s 
claim that she was discriminated against because of her failure to conform 
to the stereotypes of her gender (including the stereotype that women 
 
22.  See Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984) (denying coverage to 
transsexuals but recognizing that “some may define ‘sex’ in such a way as to mean an individual's 
‘sexual identity’”). 
23.  See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Won’t Hear Case on Bias Against Gay Workers, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/11/us/politics/supreme-court-gay-workers-
bias-case.html. 
24.  See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 236-37 (1989) (Brennan, J,, plurality); Oncale 
v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998). 
25.  490 U.S. 228 (1989). Plaintiff, Ann Hopkins, was a senior manager at Price Waterhouse in 1982 
when she was proposed for partnership; the only female candidate out of 88 people. Her candidacy for 
partnership was placed on hold for reconsideration the following year. Id. at 233. When the partners in 
her office later refused to re-propose her for partnership, she sued Price Waterhouse under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that the firm had discriminated against her on the basis of sex in 
its decisions regarding partnership. Id. at 231–32. At trial she introduced testimony that showed the 
partners in her firm were put off that she exhibited an aggressive nature, despite her seemingly high 
quality of work for her clients. Id. at 235. 
26.  Id. at 251 (internal citations omitted).  Although this opinion was technically only a plurality 
opinion, lower courts have generally treated it as binding precedent. See infra Part I. C. 
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should not be aggressive and should be more docile) was actionable under 
Title VII’s “because of sex” clause.27  
While grappling with the language of the statute, without 
acknowledging its potential impact, the Court appeared to use the terms 
gender and sex synonymously.28 While the two may at the time have been 
considered synonymous, today psychologists consider the two words to 
have two different meanings; sex being biologically based and gender 
being a social construction or expression of identity.29   
The Supreme Court also recognized a broader meaning of the word sex 
in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs.30 In holding that Title VII offers 
protections from same-sex harassment for both men and women, Justice 
Scalia wrote that the Court was going beyond the original intent of the sex 
discrimination envisioned by Congress at the time it was enacted, but that 
it was appropriate in this case to cover evils that were comparable to the 
principle evil Congress intended to cover with Title VII.31 
 
27.  Id. Hopkins presented evidence that she was denied the promotion in part because other partners 
at the firm felt that she did not act in an appropriate manner for her gender including comments that 
she was too macho, too aggressive, and used inappropriate language for a woman. Id. at 235. 
28.  For example, the Court stated “Congress' intent to forbid employers to take gender into account 
in making employment decisions appears on the face of the statute” id. at 239, despite the fact that the 
term “gender” is not used in Title VII’s language at all. One possible explanation for the term 
transition was to use a less provocative word than sex, as Ruth Bader Ginsburg explained in an 
interview that she started using gender discrimination in her cases in the 1970s because her secretary 
cautioned her that using the word “sex” would cause “distracting associations” for the Justices. 
Catherine Crocker, Ginsburg Explains Origin of Sex, Gender : Justice: Supreme Court's Newest 
Member Speaks at her Old Law School and Brings Down the House with her History Lesson About 
Fighting Bias, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 21, 1993), http://articles.latimes.com/1993-11-21/news/mn-
59217_1_supreme-court. 
29.  Gender, APA DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY ONLINE (2018), https://dictionary.apa.org/gender 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2019) (defining gender as ”the condition of being male, female, or neuter. In a 
human context, the distinction between gender and sex reflects the usage of these terms: Sex usually 
refers to the biological aspects of maleness or femaleness, whereas gender implies the psychological, 
behavioral, social, and cultural aspects of being male or female (i.e., masculinity or femininity”)). 
30.  523 U.S. 75 (1998). Plaintiff Joseph Oncale was working for Sundowner Offshore Services, 
Inc., on a Chevron U.S.A., Inc., oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico in 1991. Id. at 77. On several 
occasions, Oncale was forcibly subjected to sex-related, humiliating actions against him by supervisors 
and fellow workmen in the presence of the rest of the crew, including being physically assaulted in a 
sexual manner, and threatened him rape. Id. Oncale eventually quit, later stating that he felt that if he 
didn't leave his job he would be raped. Id. Thereafter, he filed suit alleging that he was discriminated 
against in his employment because of his sex. Id. The District Court held that Oncale, a male, had no 
cause of action under Title VII for harassment by male co-workers, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Id. 
31.  The Court stated that the harassment complained of was: 
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C. Courts Respond to Price Waterhouse & Oncale 
 
Following the Supreme Court’s rulings in Price Waterhouse and 
Oncale, lower courts altered their narrow interpretation and recognized 
claims of discrimination based on gender stereotypes. The exact 
boundaries of what discrimination claims could be raised under the 
“because of sex” umbrella became a patchwork of varying opinions, but it 
was clear that following Price Waterhouse and Oncale, claims could 
proceed under a broader definition of sex discrimination.32 However, 
courts continued to reject the argument that Title VII prohibited 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.33 In theory a clear line 
could be drawn between sexual orientation discrimination and sex 
stereotype discrimination. However, in many situations distinguishing 
between the two proved difficult. Courts acknowledged the difficulty in 
determining whether allegations represented discrimination based on an 
individual not conforming to gendered heteronormative stereotypes (and 
therefore constituted unlawful gender discrimination) or discrimination 
 
 assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII. 
But statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably 
comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal 
concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.  
  
Id. at 79. 
32.  See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004) (reasoning that Price Waterhouse 
“eviscerated” the narrow view of sex discrimination and set forth a prohibition of discrimination based 
on the failure to conform to stereotypical gender norms and holding that Title VII prohibits 
discrimination against transgender individuals based on gender stereotyping); Schroer v. Billington, 
577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding that discrimination based on the plaintiff’s gender 
transition was actionable under Title VII’s “because of … sex” statutory text); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 
F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011)(“[D]iscrimination against a transgender individual because of her 
gender-nonconformity is sex discrimination, whether it's described as being on the basis of sex or 
gender.”). 
33.  See Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that 
discrimination based on sexual orientation is not prohibited by Title VII); Medina v. Income Support 
Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 
(3d Cir. 2001); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic 
Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Hopkins v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 751–52 
(4th Cir. 1996) (stating that Title VII does not protect against discrimination based on sexual 
orientation).   
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based on sexual orientation (and therefore not protected).34 
 
D. A More Direct Approach: The EEOC Weighs In 
 
In 2015, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
addressed sexual orientation under Title VII and affirmatively stated that 
sexual orientation was protected under Title VII, in Baldwin.35 The EEOC 
provided three arguments finding Title VII prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation.36 First, the EEOC, relying on a “but for sex” 
argument, found that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
implicated that the employer took the employee’s sex into account because 
homosexual expressions to a partner are the same as heterosexual 
expressions to that same partner but for the sex of the employee.37 Second, 
the EEOC reasoned that sexual orientation discrimination is also sex 
discrimination because it is associational discrimination on the basis of 
sex.38  Third, the EEOC reasoned that discrimination on the basis of sexual 
 
34.  See Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 408 (D. Mass. 2002) (finding it difficult to 
distinguish the line between discrimination because of sexual orientation and discrimination because 
of sex since sexual orientation discrimination is often motivated by a desire to enforce heterosexually 
defined gender norms); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding 
that a gay male employee harassed by other employees for having feminine traits was actionable under 
Title VII because it was based on the employee’s failure to conform to gender norms). 
35.  Baldwin, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *4 (July 15, 2015). David 
Baldwin was an air traffic control specialist working in Miami, Florida in a temporary managerial 
position. Id at *1. Baldwin asserted that he was denied promotion to a vacant full time managerial 
position because he was gay, citing several instances when his supervisor made disparaging remarks 
when Baldwin mentioned his same-sex partner.  Id. at *2. 
36.  Id.  
37.  Id. at 5. The EEOC found that discrimination based on sexual orientation necessitates 
consideration of an employee’s sex.  For example, a lesbian employee disciplined for displaying a 
picture of her female spouse can allege that an employer took a different action against her based on 
her sex where the employer did not discipline a male employee for displaying a picture of his female 
spouse. Id. 
38.  Id. at 6. The EEOC reasoned that that an employee alleging discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation is naturally alleging that his or her employer took his or her sex into account by 
treating him or her differently for associating with a person of the same sex. For example, a gay man 
who alleges that his employer took an adverse employment action against him because he associated 
with or dated men states a claim of sex discrimination under Title VII; the fact that the employee is a 
man dating men instead of a woman dating men motivated the employer's discrimination against him. 
Similarly, a heterosexual man who alleges a gay supervisor denied him a promotion because he dates 
women instead of men states an actionable claim. Id.  This theory of associational discrimination was 
later further developed in Hively, where the majority draws on precedent from the Loving line of cases. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol60/iss1/17
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orientation is sex discrimination because it necessarily involves 
discrimination based on gender stereotypes that was expressly prohibited 
under Price Waterhouse.39 In concluding that adverse employment action 
based on sexual orientation was necessarily linked to the sex 
discrimination prohibited by Title VII, the EEOC recognized it was 
directly confronting an issue that courts had previously gone great lengths 
to bypass.40 Since Baldwin, the EEOC has filed suits in federal courts,41 
and submitted amicus briefs42 to urge courts to adopt its position that Title 
VII per se prohibits sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace. 
 
E. The Current Circuit Split43 
 
Recently, three circuits addressed the issue of whether sexual 
orientation discrimination, standing on its own, is prohibited by Title VII. 
Panels for the Second, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits held that Title VII 
could not sustain a claim for sexual orientation discrimination standing 
alone. However, sitting en banc the Second and Seventh Circuits 
overruled their earlier decisions and held that sexual orientation 
discrimination was actionable under Title VII per se as sex 
discrimination.44   
 
See infra note 62. 
39.  Baldwin, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at 8.  The EEOC reasoned that 
inherent in stereotypes of both genders is the assumption that an individual should have romantic 
relationships with the opposite gender, and therefore by having a homosexual relationship an 
individual is failing to conform to gender norms. Id. For example, the stereotype for women is that 
they date men, so a woman that dates another woman violates the gender norm for women.   
40.  Id. 
41.  See, e.g., Complaint, EEOC v. Scott Med. Health Ctr., No. 2:16-cv-00225-CB (W.D. Pa. Mar. 
1, 2016) (alleging that a gay male employee was subjected to harassment because of his sexual 
orientation); Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, EEOC v. Pallet Cos. d/b/a IFCO Sys. NA, Inc., No. 
1:16-cv-00595-RDB (D. Md. Mar. 1, 2016) (alleging that a supervisor harassed a lesbian employee 
because of her sexual orientation). 
42.  See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein, Discrimination Based On Sex Is Debated in Case of Gay Skydiver, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/nyregion/discrimination-based-on-
sex-sky-diver-donald-zarda.html?_r=0 (noting the interest division as the EEOC’s brief argues for the 
court to adopt the proposition that sex in Title VII includes sexual orientation while the Department of 
Justice for the Trump Administration argues against it). 
43.  This circuit split will likely be resolved soon as the Supreme Court has granted certiorari on this 
issue in Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019). For a discussion of the circuit court 
decision in this case see infra pp. 374. 
44.  Hively v Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Zarda v. 
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In Christiansen v. Omnicom Group Inc.,45 the Second Circuit originally 
held that the plaintiff’s complaint was not cognizable under Title VII for 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, but it was cognizable as a 
failure to conform to gender stereotypes. The court did not consider the 
merits of the arguments for or against allowing sexual orientation 
discrimination claims under Title VII, holding that the court was bound by 
a prior panel decision which held sexual orientation was not per se 
actionable under Title VII.46 The concurring opinion and a subsequent 
district court opinion immediately cast doubt on how long sexual 
orientation would continue to be precluded insightfully predicting an en 
banc reversal.47   
The Second Circuit’s disallowance of coverage, that was questioned in 
Christiansen, was quickly abrogated by the en banc decision in Zarda v. 
Altitude Express, Inc.48 In overruling contrary precedent, the Second 
Circuit recognized the need to readdress the issue since “the legal 
 
Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc). 
45.  Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F. 3d 195 (2d Cir. 2017). Plaintiff, Matthew 
Christiansen, sued his employer, supervisor, and others affiliated with his company under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act and Title VII alleging that he was discriminated against at his 
workplace due to, inter alia, his HIV–positive status and his failure to conform to gender stereotypes. 
Id. at 198. Christiansen's complaint alleged that his direct supervisor engaged in a pattern of 
humiliating harassment targeting his effeminacy and sexual orientation including suggestive and 
explicit drawings that were circulated around the office as well as multiple remarks about the 
connection between effeminacy, sexual orientation, and HIV status. Id. 
46.  When addressing the plaintiff’s request to reconsider the previous circuit decision that excluded 
sexual orientation from Title VII, the court stated that their panel could not overturn the previous 
panel’s decision “until such time as they are overruled either by an en banc panel of our Court or by 
the Supreme Court.” Id. at 199 (citations omitted).   
47.  Judge Katzmann’s concurring opinion articulates support for an approach to the issue that 
mirrors the EEOC’s decision in Baldwin, and she urges the court to reconsider the issue when the 
appropriate case presents itself. Id. at 201-07 (Katzmann, J., concurring). Judge Katzmann specifically 
finds convincing that sexual orientation could be a cognizable claim under all three approaches of 
Baldwin, namely sexual orientation discrimination is 1) cognizable under the traditional notion of sex 
discrimination, 2) cognizable under an association approach of sex discrimination, and 3) cognizable 
under a gender discrimination approach of sex discrimination. Id. Judge Katzmann similarly uses the 
EEOC’s reasoning for overcoming congressional inaction on the issue, and recognizes that societal 
understanding of same-sex relationships has change over time. Id. at 206.  See also Philpott v. New 
York, 252 F. Supp. 3d 313 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (relying on Judge Katzmann’s concurring opinion and 
holding that sexual orientation discrimination is cognizable under Title VII). 
48.  Zarda, 883 F.3d 100. Fittingly, Judge Katzmann, who called for reconsideration of the Title VII 
coverage in Christiansen wrote the opinion for the en banc court. 
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framework for evaluating Title VII claims has evolved substantially.”49 
Similar to the EEOC’s approach, the Second Circuit used three different 
perspectives, in each one reasoning that sexual orientation discrimination 
was a subset of sex discrimination.50 Finding each perspective alone 
sufficient to allow Title VII coverage, and the three taken together to 
“amply demonstrate that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex 
discrimination.”51 In holding that sexual orientation was a subset of sex 
discrimination, the Second Circuit recognized that the Congress likely 
didn’t intend to offer protections to sexual orientation when Title VII was 
enacted, but asserted that “statutory prohibitions often go beyond the 
principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils.”52  
In a decision released 15 days before Christiansen, the Eleventh Circuit 
also addressed whether sexual orientation discrimination was an 
actionable claim under Title VII in Evans v. Georgia Reg'l Hosp..53 Much 
like the Second Circuit panel in Christiansen, the Eleventh Circuit also 
considered itself to be bound by prior precedent and held that there is no 
per se sexual orientation action under Title VII.54 While the majority 
opinion quickly dismissed the sexual orientation claim on precedent, 
 
49.  Id. at 131. 
50.  Id. The first perspective can be categorized as the textual “but for sex” perspective, finding 
“sexual orientation discrimination is a subset of sex discrimination because sexual orientation is 
defined by one's sex in relation to the sex of those to whom one is attracted, making it impossible for 
an employer to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation without taking sex into account.” Id. The 
second perspective used gender stereotypes as “[s]exual orientation discrimination is also based on 
assumptions or stereotypes about how members of a particular gender should be, including to whom 
they should be attracted.” Id. And the third perspective uses an associational lens, reasoning “sexual 
orientation discrimination is associational discrimination … motivated by the employer's opposition to 
association between members of particular sexes.” Id.  
51.  Id. at 131-32. 
52.  Id. at 132 (citing Oncale, 523 U.S. 75). 
53.  850 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2017). Plaintiff, Jameka Evans, filed a claim under Title VII 
against her employer Georgia Regional Hospital and her supervisors alleging that she was 
discriminated against, inter alia, because of her sexual orientation and gender non-conformity. Id. at 
1251. Evans alleged that she was discriminated against on the basis of her sex for failing to carry 
herself in a traditional womanly manner, and although she did not broadcast her sexuality, she asserted 
that she was punished because her status as a gay female did not comport with her supervisor’s gender 
stereotypes.  Id. 
54. Id. at 1255. The prior decision Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., held that discharge for homosexuality is 
not prohibited by Title VII.  597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979). Similar to the Second Circuit, the court 
stated that the precedent could only be overturned by an en banc panel or a Supreme Court decision 
(the court reasoned that Price Waterhouse and Oncale were not directly contrary to Blum and 
therefore did not overturn it). 850 F.3d at 1255.     
Washington University Open Scholarship










304 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 60:293 
 
 
Judge William Pryor’s concurrence and Judge Robin S. Rosenbaum’s 
dissent delve into the merits of allowing sexual orientation claims to 
standalone under Title VII. Contrary to the view that sexual orientation 
claims and gender non-conforming claims are becoming blurred together, 
Judge Pryor argues that they remain two distinct legal claims.55 Judge 
Pryor posits that the Title VII only protects behaviors that fail to conform 
to gender norms, and cannot protect an LGBT person based on status 
alone.56 Judge Rosenbaum’s dissent argues that discrimination based on 
sexual orientation necessarily implicates sex discrimination because of the 
inherent heteronormative stereotyped attraction of a person’s sex.57 In 
contrast to Judge Pryor’s behavior based requirement, Judge Rosenbaum’s 
focus is more on the employee’s identity failing to conform to the 
employer’s stereotypes regardless of whether the employee has actually 
acted on that identity yet.58 
Perhaps the most ground-breaking case addressing Title VII’s 
relationship with sexual orientation discrimination was the Seventh 
Circuit’s en banc decision that held that sexual orientation discrimination 
is per se actionable under Title VII, in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community 
College of Indiana.59  The en banc court reversed the panel’s decision and 
held that employment discrimination based on sexual orientation is 
actionable under Title VII.60 The majority opinion dismissed the defense’s 
 
55.  Id. at 1258. 
56.  Id. at 1259. Pyror relied on Price Waterhouse and Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 
2011) (recognizing an employer violated Title VII for adverse action taken against an employee that 
wished to transition before she had actually transitioned with Judge Pryor concurring). He argued these 
cases only “concerned behavior, not status, and that current doctrine does not protect on the basis of 
status alone.” Id. Judge Pyror further argues assuming people that identify as gay do not conform to 
gender norms goes too far because it does not account for the “diversity of experiences of gay 
individuals,” including individuals that choose to not date or choose to remain celibate. Id. 
57.  Id. at 1261. This echoes the “but for” argument the Second Circuit relied on in Christiansen. 
See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
58.  Judge Rosenbaum draws this inference from Glenn. Id. at 1265. 
59.  853 F.3d 339, 351-52 (7th Cir. 2017). Plaintiff, Kimberly Hively, was an openly lesbian 
teaching as a part-time, adjunct professor at Ivy Tech Community College's South Bend campus since 
2000. Id. at 341. She applied for and was denied at least six full-time positions between 2009 and 2014 
and in July 2014 her part-time contract was not renewed. Id. Believing that Ivy Tech was spurning her 
because of her sexual orientation, she filed a pro se charge with the EEOC claiming she was being 
discriminated against for her sexual orientation in violation of Title VII.  Id.   
60.  Id. at 351-52. The Seventh Circuit panel to hear the case originally, relied heavily on precedent 
stating “our precedent holds that Title VII provides no protection from nor redress for discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation.” Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., S. Bend, 830 F.3d 698, 718 (7th 
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argument relying on instructive congressional intent, and chose to pursue a 
more comparative analysis of statutory intent.61 The majority opinion 
found sexual orientation fell under “sex” for purposes of Title VII using 
both the traditional “but for” considering the employee’s sex approach, 
and the sex-based association approach.62  
Judge Posner offered a new analytical framework for finding a per se 
violation of Title VII for sexual orientation discrimination. In his 
concurring opinion, Judge Posner applied a unique approach of “judicial 
interpretive updating” in which he acknowledges that “sex” was not meant 
to include sexual orientation when the law was enacted, but since society 
has come to take a more positive view on homosexuality, the court was 
justified in updating Title VII to include sexual orientation.63 Judge 
Flaum’s concurrence also found that sexual orientation discrimination was 
actionable under Title VII, but placed emphasis on the identity of 
homosexuality as opposed to relational aspects.64  
In addition to challenging the majority’s application of precedent cases, 
the dissent articulates two bases of reasoning for denying the extension of 
 
Cir. 2016), as amended (Aug. 3, 2016), reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 15-1720, 2016 
WL 6768628 (7th Cir. Oct. 11, 2016), and on reh'g en banc sub nom. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. 
of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017). The panel noted that the “writing [was] on the wall” that 
society cannot tolerate this discrimination much longer, and that the “court undoubtedly does not 
condone” the discrimination, but held that without a Supreme Court opinion or new legislation the 
court was bound by precedent. Id. 
61.  The majority, similar to EEOC, did not find failed congressional attempts to add sexual 
orientation to the statute, nor the original intent of the legislators as persuasive, finding that the 
Supreme Court opinions that broadened the scope beyond “cover[ing] far more than the simple 
decision of an employer not to hire a woman for Job A, or a man for Job B.” Id. at 345. 
62.  The majority relying on precedent, compared gender non-conforming cases, reasoned that under 
the traditional “but for” sex approach, “the discriminatory behavior does not exist without taking the 
victim's biological sex … into account.” Id. at 346-47. Similarly, under the associational approach, the 
majority used the Loving line of cases as an analogy to reason that “to the extent that the statute 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of the race of someone with whom the plaintiff associates, it also 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of the national origin, or the color, or the religion, or (as relevant 
here) the sex of the associate.” Id. at 347-49. 
63.  Id. at 353 (Posner, J., concurring).  
64.  Id. at 359 (Flaum, J., concurring). Judge Flaum’s reasoning uses a textual approach with the 
definition of homosexuality as being sexually attracted “to individuals of the ‘same sex.’” Id. at 358.  
Judge Flaum concluded that based on the definition of homosexuality, the consideration of an 
employee’s homosexuality must always take into account (A) the sex of the employee and (B) their 
sexual attraction to individuals of the same sex, therefore it is impossible to view homosexuality 
without taking into account the sex of the employee. Id. 
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sexual orientation protections.65  First, the dissent argued that the law 
should be interpreted as a common, reasonable person would at the time it 
was enacted, and therefore it is unreasonable to conclude that “sex” 
includes sexual orientation.66 Second, the dissent argued, that the majority 
improperly compared the treatment of a certain heterosexual gender with 
the homosexual version of the same gender. The dissent argued the proper 
comparison would be comparing two homosexuals of different genders.67 
 In sum, as of the date of publication of this Note, Title VII appears to 
apply inconsistently to LGBT individuals across the United States. 
Although, circuit courts have generally come to a consensus that sex 
stereotyping claims does not exclude LGBT plaintiffs, discrimination on 
the grounds of sexual orientation alone varies by circuit. Some circuits, 
typically citing binding precedent, adhere to the rigid construction that 
Title VII’s sex classification does not apply to sexual orientation 
discrimination.68  While the EEOC and the only two circuits to address the 
issue en banc have held that Title VII’s “because of sex” 
antidiscrimination prohibition applies to sexual orientation discrimination 
as it would apply to sex or gender discrimination.69  Authorities granting 
Title VII protection to sexual orientation generally cite three arguments for 
concluding that sexual orientation is a logical subset of sex classification.  
First, the textual “but for sex” argument, reasons that sexual orientation 
discrimination is a subset of sex discrimination because sexual orientation 
is defined by one’s sex in relation to the sex of those to whom one in a 
relationship with, making it impossible for an employer to discriminate on 
the basis of sexual orientation without taking sex into account.70 The 
 
65.  Id. at 360-74 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
66.  The dissent finds it unreasonable to include sexual orientation within the meaning of sex 
because dictionary definitions and “ordinary meanings” of the word “sex” to an average English 
speaker do not include sexual orientation. Id. at 362-63. Furthermore, the dissent finds it persuasive 
that later enactments passed by congress have included “sexual orientation” and “sex” implying that 
they are in fact separate terms. Id.   
67.  The dissent argues that a person that is discriminating against gays and lesbians alike regardless 
of their gender purely for being homosexuals is only engaging in homophobia (and therefore not 
actionable under Title VII) and not sexism (which would be actionable under Title VII). Id. at 365. 
68.  See Evans v. Georgia Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017); see also Senegal v. Yum! 
Brands, Inc., No. CV H-18-1734, 2019 WL 448943, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 2019) (holding Title VII 
does not protect against discrimination based on sexual orientation). 
69.  See supra notes 35, 14, and 2. 
70.  See e.g., Zarda, 883 F.3d at 131. 
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second argument applies gender stereotypes, since sex stereotypes include 
assumptions or stereotypes about how members of a particular gender 
should be, including heteronormative views about whom they should be 
attracted to.71 And the third associational argument, reasons that sexual 
orientation discrimination is prohibited se associational discrimination 
because it’s motivated by the employer's opposition to the employee’s 
personal association among members of particular sexes.72 
 
II. HOW TO ACHIEVE LGBT PROTECTION 
 
A. The Problem 
 
Many courts and scholars have recognized that sexual orientation and 
gender identity have no relationship with workplace performance,73 and 
yet individuals that identify as LGBT continue to face higher rates of 
employment related discrimination than their cis-gendered, heterosexual 
peers.74 Such discriminatory environments affect more than just a person’s 
ability to get and retain a job. Studies have shown that compared to 
heterosexual peers, LGBT people have higher rates of mental and physical 
health disparities in part due to discriminatory work environments.75 
Unfortunately, as the above history shows, attempts to remedy harmful 
employment discrimination against LGBTQ employees have only 
 
71.  Id. 
72.  Id. 
73.  See Brad Sears & Christy Mallory, ., Documented Evidence of Employment Discrimination & 
Its Effects on LGBT People, THE WILLIAMS INST., 2 (2011), available at 
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Sears-Mallory-Discrimination-July-20111.pdf 
(citing to numerous court and scholar opinions that hold that LGBTQ identities have no actual 
relationship with the employee’s ability to perform their job). 
74.  A collection of national surveys showed that of the LGB respondents: 18% had experienced 
employment discrimination in applying for and/or in keeping a job because of their sexual orientation, 
10% were fired or denied a promotion because of their sexual orientation, and 58% reported hearing 
derogatory comments about sexual orientation and gender identity in their workplaces. Id. 
75.  Jennifer C. Pizer, Brad Sears, Christy Mallory, & Nan D. Hunter, Evidence of Persistent and 
Pervasive Workplace Discrimination Against LGBT People: The Need for Federal Legislation 
Prohibiting Discrimination and Providing for Equal Employment Benefits, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 715, 
738-42 (2012). “The ‘minority stress model’ suggests that prejudice, stigma, and discrimination create 
a social environment characterized by excess exposure to stress, which, in turn, results in health 
disparities for sexual minorities compared with heterosexuals.” Id. at 738. 
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succeeded in a limited number of instances.76 While some LGBT 
employees may be able to obtain a remedy from discrimination under Title 
VII if they can argue their circumstances fall under the sex-stereotyping 
caselaw,77 the sex-stereotyping claim is far too limited to provide all of the 
vulnerable members of the LGBTQ community protection. And although 
residents of the Seventh and Second Circuits may, for the time being, sue 
for discrimination against homosexuals,78 residents elsewhere may 
permissibly be terminated simply for being gay.  
Furthermore, other queer identities and sexualities are left with even 
less certainty about what their legal rights are regarding employment. For 
example, bisexuals and asexuals do not easily fit into the sex-stereotyping 
claims, nor can they confidently rely on the Seventh or Second Circuits 
reasonings for per se coverage. To illustrate this point, consider the 
following hypothetical. Suppose a bisexual man is currently in a 
relationship with a women, but is terminated when his employer finds out 
about his sexuality. As a man currently in a relationship with a woman, he 
would appear to be comporting with the heteronormative sex-stereotype 
that men should date women. Furthermore, under the associational view, 
he could not allege that he was terminated because of the sex he is 
currently romantically involved with because their respective sexes again 
comport with traditional values. It is unclear how even in the Second or 
Seventh Circuits his identity would matter to a court if his current 
relationship mimicked a heteronormative one.79 The artificial partition of 
his identity and his current state of romantic involvement produces a 
strange predicament, where as a bisexual he would move in and out of 
legal protection as he entered relationships with partners of differing 
 
76.  See supra notes 44, 53, and 59. 
77.  Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly addressed sex-stereotype discrimination in the 
context of transgender employees so it is not guaranteed. 
78.  See infra Part I.B. 
79.  While some might doubt that a bisexual person with a partner of the opposite sex would be 
discriminated against, studies have shown that bisexuals face discrimination at higher rates including 
discrimination within the queer community from gays and lesbians. See Kim Parker, Among LGBT 
Americans, Bisexuals Stand Out When It Comes to Identity, Acceptance, FACT TANK, Feb. 20, 2015, 
available at http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/02/20/among-lgbt-americans-bisexuals-stand-
out-when-it-comes-to-identity-acceptance/; see also Eric Ethington, New report highlights 
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genders. The current legal framework leads to similar confusion when 
considering other identities like asexuality or polyamorists. Even the 
textual “but for sex” argument does not appear to protect these identities 
that are vulnerable to discrimination because of their relationships, 
independent of the employee’s sex. How does a court begin to evaluate 
whether something falls outside sex-stereotypes when there is no other 
partner, or when there are multiple partners? Using a dichotomous view of 
sex stereotypes to grant or deny protection from discrimination is 
antiquated, and it is insufficient to grant vulnerable identities protection 
that continue to emerge (or become more visible) as society evolves. 
 
B. Legislative Remedy? 
 
Some activists and judges, including the dissent in Hively and the 
concurrence in Evans, argue that whether Title VII provides a remedy for 
sexual orientation discrimination must be addressed through legislative 
action.80 Congressional efforts to amend Title VII to add sexual orientation 
as a distinct protected class can be traced as far back as 1974.81 However, 
that initial attempt to add sexual orientation as a protected class to Title 
VII, as well as the numerous attempts since in nearly every legislative 
session, have been unsuccessful.82 The argument that Title VII must be 
legislative amended to add LGBT protected classifications is supported by 
the classical canon that substantive changes in statutory based law should 
come in the form of legislation and not through judicial activism.83 
Amending Title VII to include sexual orientation and gender identity 
 
80.  Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 361 (7th Cir. 2017) (Sykes, J., 
dissenting); Evans v. Georgia Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1261 (11th Cir. 2017) (Pryor, J., 
concurring); see also Ryan Thoreson, Why the US needs the Equality Act, HUMAN RIGHTS 
CAMPAIGN, Mar. 16, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/16/why-us-needs-equality-act 
(arguing that even if Title VII covers sexual orientation, federal legislation is a better means of 
clarifying the law and protecting LGBT people). 
81.  See H.R. 15692, 93d Cong. (1974); William C. Sung, Taking the Fight Back to Title VII: A 
Case for Redefining "Because of Sex" to Include Gender Stereotypes, Sexual Orientation, and Gender 
Identity, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 487, 496 (2011). 
82.  Evans., 850 F.3d at 1261 (collecting proposed legislative actions that attempted to add sexual 
orientation as a protected class to Title VII). 
83 See e.g., Hively, 853 F.3d at 361 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (arguing that LGBT protection inclusion in 
Title VII must come from elected representatives, and not the judicial branch).  
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would quickly provide clarity and uniformity for employees and 
employers across the U.S. For example, a masculine gay man that was 
discriminated against by their employer based on his sexuality would no 
longer have to fear whether the court would accept the proxy argument 
that their particular homophobic discrimination was actually 
discrimination based on their failure to conform to gender norms.  
Additionally, the administrative burden placed on Congress and the 
courts would be relatively low. The legislature would not have to draft 
new administrative procedures or new remedies as they would merely be 
allowing the vulnerable class to utilize the already well-established system 
under Title VII. And although there may be an increase in the number of 
plaintiffs that are able to seek remedy in the courts with the widening of 
the protected classification, the burden on the courts would not be 
substantial as it would simultaneous simplify suits that already attempt to 
bring the same claims under proxy legal constructs that attempt to mold 
the discrimination into sex-stereotyping claims. Furthermore, for 
originalists, a legislative amendment satisfies the preference that social 
policy advancement is more appropriate for Congress and not for courts. 
Alternatively, another option for protecting LGBTQ employees from 
workplace discrimination would be for Congress to pass a standalone anti-
discrimination bill. A clear example of this type of legislation is the 
Employment Non-Discrimination Act (“ENDA”) proposed in the 103rd 
Congress.84 ENDA came on the heels of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act,85 which successfully used standalone legislation to provide anti-
discrimination protection to classes not directly covered under Title VII. 
Similar to amending Title VII, a bill like ENDA would satisfy the 
textualist view leaving discretion of social progress to the legislature. It 
would also help clarify the rights of employees and set a unified national 
standard. However, as a standalone piece of legislation, it does not have 
the same benefit of the low administrative burden of implementation that 
is possible through amending Title VII. Although ENDA was structured to 
 
84.  See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1994, H.R. 4636, 103d Cong. (1994); 
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1994, S. 2238, 103d Cong. (1994). 
85.  Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 and 47 U.S.C.). 
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parallel Title VII enforcement and remedies,86 actual enforcement 
procedures and court decisions would not have the forty-year precedent of 
Title VII to actually ensure the bill is enacted as the legislators intended. 
Furthermore, as ENDA shows, a standalone legislative effort is far more 
susceptible to compromises that render it ineffective.87 Although 
admirable for attempting to advance LGBTQ rights, the standalone bills 
have suffered from the same lack of Congressional support as Title VII 
amendments. For example, the Employment Nondiscrimination Act of 
2013 that would have prohibited employment discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation or gender identity never even made it passed 
committee referral.88 
 At first glance, an amendment to Title VII to incorporate LGBTQ 
protected classifications would be the ideal route to protect employees. 
However, every day spent waiting for Congress to act unnecessarily 
subjects vulnerable members of our population to wrongful discrimination. 
Although a bill to amend Title VII was introduced in the House of 
Representatives in May of 2017, the bill did not even get a committee 
vote.89 In fact, none of the bills proposed in the last ten years that 
addressed LGBT employment discrimination passed.90 Furthermore, 
President Trump’s administration has repeatedly taken actions against 
LGBT interests,91 making it highly probable that Trump would veto any 
expansion of protection passed by Congress. 
 While some might attribute the failure to institute employment 
protections of LGBTQ employees as the will of the people, public 
sentiment contradicts this argument. A 2014 study showed “[m]ore than 7-
in-10 (72%) Americans favor laws protecting gay and lesbian people from 
 
86.  JODY FEDER & CYNTHIA BROUGHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40934, SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
AND GENDER IDENTITY DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE EMPLOYMENT 
NON-DISCRIMINATION ACT (ENDA) (2013). 
87.  See Sung, supra note 10, at 508, 510 (highlighting ENDA’s weaker ability to protect LGBT 
minorities due to the “expansive religious exemptions” and the inability to bring disparate impact 
claims). 
88.  S. 815, 113th Cong. (2013). 
89.  H.R. 2282, 115th Cong. (2017). 
90.  See A History of Federal Non-Discrimination Legislation, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (Oct. 20, 
2017), https://www.hrc.org/resources/a-history-of-federal-non-discrimination-legislation. 
91.  See, e.g., Trump’s Record of Action Against Transgender People, NATIONAL CENTER FOR 
TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, (Feb. 27, 2019) available at https://transequality.org/the-discrimination-
administration. 
Washington University Open Scholarship










312 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 60:293 
 
 
job discrimination, compared to less than one-quarter (23%) who 
oppose.”92 Congress has been historically prejudiced against the LGBTQ 
community in spite of growing tolerance and understanding by the public, 
Congress’s only response has been to curb the rights of LGBTQ people, 
evidenced by legislation like the Defense of Marriage Act.93 For example, 
polls show that public support for legal recognition of gay marriage 
reached a majority as far back as 2011 and continued to grow over the 
years,94 but no Congressional action to legalize gay marriage ever made it 
close to a vote.95 In reality, the impetus of Congress to act in the interests 
of the LGBTQ community is not surprising considering the 
disproportionately low number of federal legislators that identify as 
LGBT.96 Similarly, state legislatures cannot be relied on for a relief. The 
majority of state legislatures have failed to pass laws that would protect 
LGBT employees from discrimination, leaving only a patchwork of 
protection across the US.97 
 
C. Judicial Remedy? 
 
Considering Congress’s history of failing to keep up with social science 
advances and the evolution of American culture, courts must be willing 
 
92.  Robert P. Jones, Daniel Cox, & Juhem Navarro-Rivera, A Shifting Landscape: A Decade of 
Change in American Attitudes about Same-sex Marriage and LGBT Issues, PRRI (Feb. 26, 2014), 
http://www.prri.org/research/2014-lgbt-survey/. 
93.  The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) (Pub. L. 104–199, 110 Stat. 2419, enacted September 
21, 1996, 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C) (ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court). 
94.  Justin McCarthy, U.S. Support for Gay Marriage Edges to New High, GALLUP (May 15, 2017), 
http://news.gallup.com/poll/210566/support-gay-marriage-edges-new-high.aspx. 
95.  A proposed bill to repeal the Defense of Marriage Act was introduced in both the House and the 
Senate, but neither made it further than committee referral. See H.R. 2523, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 
1236 113th Cong. (2013). 
96.  Exact proportions are difficult to quantify for LGBT populations as relevant data. However, a 
2017 Gallup poll that showed 4.1% of respondents self-identified as LGBT, and yet in 2017 there were 
only seven of the 535 congressional members (or 1.3%) that publicly identify as LGBT.  See Gary J. 
Gates, In U.S., More Adults Identifying as LGBT, GALLUP (Jan. 11, 2017), 
http://news.gallup.com/poll/201731/lgbt-identification-rises.aspx. 
97.  As of 2017, only twenty states and the District of Columbia have employment non-
discrimination laws covering sexual orientation and gender identity, with two more states have laws 
covering sexual orientation only. Furthermore, three states have passed laws that prevent local 
governments from passing or enforcing non-discrimination laws. See Non-Discrimination Laws, 
MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT (Oct. 20, 2017), available at http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-
maps/non_discrimination_laws. 
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enforce the spirit of Title VII by extending the antidiscrimination 
protections to historically marginalized and vulnerable people subjected to 
wrongful prejudice. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Oncale and Price 
Waterhouse reinforce the idea that in order to strike out evils like 
discrimination courts may be called to challenge the rigidity of terms once 
thought definite, like the meaning of sex.98 Decisions that followed 
incrementally expanded the scope of protection as society’s understanding 
of underlying prejudicial biases evolved. However, attempting to fit 
modern understandings of identities into antiquated terms used over half a 
century ago misses the point. 
The core purpose of Title VII was to protect the fundamental right for a 
person to work and provide for themselves without baseless 
discrimination.99 The provision’s list of protected classes were some of the 
identities most subjected to discrimination at the time of the enactment, to 
the extent that the legislators at the time must have felt were worthy of 
protecting. However, viewing the list of race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin as an exhaustive list of identities deserving of protection 
misplaces the wisdom of the drafting legislators and the spirit of the law. 
Title VII was enacted to protect marginalized employees that had a history 
of being discriminated against and to combat the evils Congress saw in the 
employment setting.100 The wisdom of Congress providing a vehicle to 
combat rampant discrimination, should not imply that Congress was just 
as wise in selecting what groups were included and worthy of protection.  
The classes expressly included surely did not include all minorities that 
were wrongly discriminated against at the time of enactment, but rather the 
minorities that the legislators were willing to defend. It is not surprising 
that LGBTQ identities were not included as protected classes since at that 
time any non-heteronormative identity was publicly demoralized and 
taboo.101  
 It is the proposition of this Note that in the absence of Congressional 
will to act, rather than attempting to redefine the classes enumerated in the 
 
98.  See supra notes 31 and 24. 
99.  Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. L. REV. 431 (1966). 
100.  Id. 
101.  In fact, homosexuality was considered a pathological illness by the American Psychiatric 
Association until 1973. See Jack Drescher, Out of DSM: Depathologizing Homosexuality, 5 BEHAV. 
SCI. 565 (2015). 
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text of Title VII, courts should apply an approach akin to Judge Posner’s 
“judicial interpretive updating” to enforce the spirit of the law. This Note 
is by no means arguing for the judiciary to act on its own will without 
restraint. Instead, with respect to the narrow issue of what identities can 
seek recovery for baseless discrimination, courts should be enabled to 
recognize coverage for vulnerable identities that are closely related to 
those enumerated categories, but that don’t neatly fit within them. Courts 
historically have conducted similar analysis with regard to applying 
differing levels of scrutiny to equal protection claims.102 Under this 
approach, courts should seek to serve the spirit of the law protecting 
marginalized groups from wrongful discrimination with a modern lens that 
considers current disadvantaged identities. And as long as the courts 
utilize similar factors used for determining suspect classifications, the 
extension or protections should avoid unfair judicial abuse (like granting 
protective status to the minority class of billionaires) because only those 
that are truly disadvantaged would be entitled protective status. While this 
approach may reach the same outcome for some identities as attempting to 
redefine the term “sex” in Title VII, it goes further to allow protection for 
other marginalized identities that may fall outside the obsolete sexual and 
gender binaries. In particular, this approach would enable courts to 
squarely address minority identities like bisexuality and asexuality and 
extend clear legal coverage even though their identity is not based on the 
sex of them and their partners.103 
This approach, while bold, is consistent with Supreme Court precedent. 
In Price Waterhouse, the Court’s expansion of protection to prohibit sex-
stereotyping under Title VII was supported by social science 
advancements that illustrated the harmful nature of it.104 Price Waterhouse 
 
102.  See, e.g., Caroline Marschilok, et. al., Equal Protection, 18 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 537, 542–43 
(2017) (noting that courts have used factors including history of discrimination, immutability of the 
identity, and disadvantaged positions in the political process in order to determine which 
classifications should be considered suspect for equal protection analysis). 
103.  Under the EEOC/Hively reasoning, a court may find that these identities fall under a more 
gender non-conforming behavior because they do not conform to the stereotype of being attracted only 
to the opposite sex, but it is unclear since both decisions relied on multiple prongs including the sex of 
the employee and their partners. At the very least a more liberal approach allows for courts to take a 
more honest and straight forward approach. 
104. The American Psychological Association played an active role in providing analysis and briefs 
to the trial court and the Supreme Court in understanding the background of the study of sex-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol60/iss1/17










2019]  An Updated Approach to Title VII Claims 315 
 
 
shows the Court’s willingness to step in as societal understanding of social 





Federal courts should adopt a more liberal allowance for claims under 
Title VII for discrimination against LGBTQ employees. A person’s 
LGBTQ identity should never be permissible grounds for discrimination in 
employment. The irreversible harm to LGBTQ individuals reaches far 
beyond earning a paycheck. Without judicial intervention, LGBTQ 
employees are left with an inconsistent patchwork of protections that 
results in disparate deliverance of justice across the country. Courts should 
be enabled to approach Title VII employment discrimination cases with an 
adaptable modern lens that is better able to recognize the advancements in 
social understandings of identities and the groups subjected to wrongful 
discrimination. Courts are well equipped and have experience analyzing 
potential classes of identities for characteristics of vulnerability and should 
be able to exercise the narrow authority to extend protected status in the 
true spirit of anti-discrimination law. Congress has proven unwilling and 
ineffective at protecting the rights of members of the LGBTQ community 
in the past and legislative remedy currently appears illusory at best. Thus, 
it falls on the courts to see that the spirit of Title VII is enforced and the 







   
 
stereotyping and its relevance for the case. See Susan T. Fiske et al., Social Science Research on Trial: 
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